Showing posts with label work. Show all posts
Showing posts with label work. Show all posts

07 September 2020

The Future of Work Lies at the Intersection of Flow, Income, Meaning and the Popularization of Entrepreneurship

Some thoughts on labor on this its day.

One of my heroes, Deming, used to argue that the worker deserved to take pride in her work. To feel proud of what you do you have to feel like it matters, it is valued, and that it represents your best.

One chief difference between work and a hobby is pay. One reason I like markets is that it is a way for the community to signal what it values. You may want to write another folk song but what the folks in your neighborhood will actually pay for is someone who can solve the problem of getting them food at lunchtime or to devise a better solution for running rainwater off of - or collecting solar energy onto - their roof. Pay is the community conspiring to vote on what would be valuable to them and not just to you. That makes us all a little more relevant, forcing us outside of ourselves.

One of my other heroes, Csikszentmihalyi, studied the psychology of engagement, what he called flow. It turns out that we're happiest when we're doing something that requires our full attention. When we're in flow we face clear goals, there is a balance between our skills and the challenge we face, we are free from distractions, we are animated by clear - rather than conflicted - priorities, there is a perfect overlap between what we're thinking about, wishing for, and doing, we are not worried about failure (one's mind has no room to simulate that outcome, so fully engaged is it in the task at hand), we lose track of time, the activity becomes worth doing for its own sake, and the self becomes more developed as the result of this state of flow, this absorption in the task.

Flow is a fabulous thing but for many it is easier to find in a video game than in work. A video game provides little meaning, though.

A task is meaningful if it serves a purpose bigger than that task. One guy might be cutting stone and the guy beside him - engaged in the exact same task - may be building a cathedral, be glorifying God. Sometimes meaning is simply a matter of framing your work as something bigger than the task at hand. More often it is being animated by what a difference your work makes in the lives of others, even in the lives of future generations.

As we become more affluent, we may rather paradoxically define ourselves even more by our work. Identity is often bound up in our job and in answer to the question, "What do you do?" we rarely say, "Stay current on politics," or "Read all of Michael Connelly's new novels." We tell folks what we do for a living. But as work becomes less essential to covering the necessary costs of life, we may expect that we not just get paid in money but in flow and meaning as well.

Faulkner wrote, “You can’t drink eight hours a day. Or make love. Work’s about the only thing a fellow has to do to keep from being bored” We have a number of examples of folks in the modern world who have made more money than they can spend and yet a great number of them continue to work. I suspect that we peons will follow their example and increasingly demand of our work these elements of pay, flow and meaning even as incomes rise.

Video game designers, TV producers, and designers of social media know how to capture and hold attention. What I suspect will define much of the modern corporation is that it will distinguish itself not by the products it designs - its employees will do that - but by its design of work so that employee efforts create income, flow and meaning. The founder of companies in the early 1900s became wildly successful by designing products like safety razors and automobiles. I suspect that we'll look back at the founder of successful companies in the early 2000s as successfully designing work to attract the best and brightest.

Keep in mind that Facebook, Twitter and Instagram aren't producers of any content in the same way that Newsweek, CBS or the New York Times are. They are platforms. I think that corporations in general will take on a similar relationship with employees in the future, focusing on creating great work rather than great products or services, positioning themselves as a platform rather than maker of products. This is part of what I mean by the term, "the popularization of entrepreneurship." Employees will create the new products, services and businesses that generate new jobs and wealth. The corporation will create the systems and roles that facilitate those outcomes.

Work matters. Profoundly. It has the potential to define us as much as anything else in life. Think of the people who stand out in history, people as different as Picasso, da Vinci, Marie Curie, Maria Montessori, Beethoven, Bjork, and Kurt Vonnegut. We know them through their work. Work is key to how we become who we are. And just like us, our labor continues to evolve. I suspect it will matter even more in the future than it does now.

Happy Labor Day!

29 August 2020

Design of Work as Play - the Future Has Arrived

Studying flow - the psychology of engagement - decades ago, it occurred to me that the ultimate profitable business would be one that designed work to be as engaging as play and charged kids to do work they perceived as play. Imagine profit margins in that sort of world.

Well, that world may have arrived. Here's a kid playing the game of stocking shelves at a convenience store, controlling a robot from a distance.

https://soranews24.com/2020/08/29/japanese-convenience-store-chain-begins-testing-remote-controlled-robot-staff-in-tokyo/


25 May 2019

The Most Underrated Inventions of the 20th Century?

Robert J. Gordon's Rise and Fall of American Growth includes some stunning statistics about the American workforce.

First, the 20th century saw an outbreak of fabulous inventions. The automobile, radio, and light bulb were among the inventions made in the 19th century that were popularized in the 20th century. Additionally, inventions like the airplane, the polio vaccine, and the computer originated in the 20th century. I don't think the best inventions of that century get enough credit, though.

In 1870, male labor force participation rate for those 65-75 was 88 percent. Before social security or the popularization of financial tools like pension plans and investment accounts, people essentially had to work until they died. 

30% of boys 10 to 15 (and 50% of boys 14 to 15) also worked. And this is a formal count. More would have helped on family farms and not been counted. Kids had to quickly help with family finances. By 1940, this had dropped. Kids were in school instead.

Work changed too. The percentage of the workforce engaged in blue-collar work classified as operators (largely factory workers) and laborers held steady from about 1870 to 1970. Between 1970 and 2009, the percentage was halved to 11.6%. Meanwhile, workers engaged in "non-routine cognitive" work steadily rose from 8% in 1870 to 37.6% in 2009. The ratio of cognitive work to factory work rose from 0.4 to 3.2.

Work that builds up our intelligence rather than breaks down our body is yet another great invention of the 20th century.

Along with all this, the workweek fell from 60 hours to less than 40.

Childhood and work are becoming more interesting and less grueling. We have retirement and two-day weekends. That is at least as cool as automobiles and smart phones. I would say that childhood, weekends, and retirement are the most underrated inventions of the 20th century.

01 September 2017

Progress, Sex, and the 24 Hour Workweek

About 90% of men had a job in 1900. (The Labor Force Participation Rate, or LFPR is the measure of this.)
The workweek was 60 hours.

Nearly the same percentage of men - 86% - had jobs in 1950.
The workweek was 40 hours.

Between 1900 and 1950, the workweek shortened and roughly the same percentage of men had jobs. Productivity gains translated into a shorter workweek rather than fewer jobs.

In 2017, about 63% of men have jobs.
The work week is about 34 hours.

Since 1950, productivity gains have translated into a slightly shorter workweek and a significantly smaller percentage of men with jobs.

To keep the same percentage of men employed would have meant a workweek of 24 hours instead of 34 (or 40).



Let me briefly digress onto the topic of sex.

Reading history made me deeply sympathetic to people who we would today call prudes. Pregnancy and childbirth could easily kill a woman a century ago. What people today may consider, "regular, healthy sex" could mean supporting a dozen children, a woman's life metaphorically lost to the logistics of child rearing if her life isn't first quite literally lost in the act of childbirth. To find sex alarming a century or two ago seems to me a wildly rational impulse. There was nothing casual about sex in this time, fraught as it was with sobering consequences.

The Pill - and more broadly, a variety of safe contraceptives - has changed sex. Technically speaking, given the rate at which women died in childbirth, a healthy sex life 100 years ago probably meant celibacy. Today, with contraceptives, a healthy sex life can mean sex throughout the week. Sex has been largely separated from childbirth and even when childbirth follows, it is much safer for mother and child. Casual sex is no longer an oxymoron.

The separation of sex from the natural consequence of childbirth caused a sexual revolution. For one thing, premarital sex has become fairly common in the West for the simple reason that sex no longer has to mean pregnancy. Everyone has to find and define their own morality in this time of easy contraception but the consequences of casual sex are far less dire than they were a century ago. This has forced people to rethink what they consider moral. You may have traditional or modern views on sex but whatever drives them it no longer has to be wrestling with the inevitability of childbirth.

Now let me return to the topic of work.

There was a time when 90-some percent of the population had to work simply to feed everyone. To have someone in your group slacking off could translate into starvation or malnutrition after harvest. In this period it made sense to be harsh with folks who weren't working. Today, though, productivity advances mean that we can feed everyone with just 2% of the workforce. No one is going to starve because a few guys in the corner are playing solitaire.

Technology has made it easier to be productive. We have a traditional definition of work ethic that includes - among other things - a 40 hour workweek. Technology and management enhancements have challenged that model in the same way that contraceptives have challenged notions of morality. 4 six-hour days could be to us what 5 eight-hour days were to our grandparents. Proof that we don't need everyone working 40 hours a week is that only 73% as many men are working as did in 1950. It's a fact that we don't need as many hours worked to enjoy our current level of prosperity; the question is whether we adjust to that by having fewer men work 40 hour weeks or having the same percentage of men work 24 hour weeks.

Gains in productivity, like the Pill, have challenged traditional notions of morality and ethics. You may have traditional or modern views on work but whatever drives them, it no longer has to be worry that if someone slacks off we won't have enough to eat.

If we were to lower the workweek to 24 hours, it could result in labor force participation rates of over 80% (assuming the same total number of hours worked as we do now with 63% of men working nearly 40 hour weeks).

How could this help? For one thing, it would result in a broader distribution of wages, a correction to growing income inequality. For another, people working 24 hours a week could have time to engage in creative endeavors that are high-risk and high-return. Pursuit of art, music, business startups or any of a number of efforts that are likely to fail but - should they succeed - have the potential to make the individual rich or gratified and positively change society.  More time outside of work could result in more binge watching of Netflix shows but also more socializing, exercise, startups, sex, and creativity. More people with jobs could even translate into lower incarceration rates.

Having sex need not mean facing the risk of childbirth. Cutting back on hours worked need not mean facing the risk of starvation. Progress has broken old linkages and given us choices that previous generations did not have.

What a 24 hour workweek would mean, of course, is a change in the definition of work ethic. That's not a tough thing, though. There was a time just a century ago when we thought it normal to work 6 ten-hour days. Why not change that again to 4 six-hour days? It could be fascinating to see what might happen.


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Quick acknowledgement.
One reason LFPR for men has dropped is because the LFPR for women has gone up. It might not make sense for men's LFPR to remain closer to 90% when women's LFPR has nearly doubled (rising from 32.4% in 1948 to 57.3% in 2017, roughly 70 years later). Still, the general principle of shorter workweek as a means to sustain higher LFPR holds.

03 May 2017

Where Economic and Psychological Progress are at Odds (a partial explanation of how obviously bad policies can make for good politics)

Trump listens to his gut. While he may not be self-made man, his facts are, and he shows a disinterest in sustained thinking or nuanced thoughts.

His reliance on instinct and disdain for theory has taken him past what we know of how economies work to what he feels about how individuals feel about psychology of work. Freud could better explain Trump's economic policies than could Keynes.

Over the last couple of centuries, the economy has obviously made us more prosperous. Our prosperity from our work has increased more obviously than our contentment, though. What has obviously worked economically has less obviously worked psychologically. This is partly because of division of labor.

Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, the book that was arguably the first to define capitalism, opens with the account of division of labor as a force that had multiplied productivity.

THE greatest improvement in the productive powers of labour … seem to have been the effects of the division of labour. ,,,, To take an example ... the trade of the pin-maker. One man draws out the wire, another straights it, a third cuts it, a fourth points it, a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving, the head; to make the head requires two or three distinct operations; to put it on is a peculiar business, to whiten the pins is another; it is even a trade by itself to put them into the paper; and the important business of making a pin is, in this manner, divided into about eighteen distinct operations, which, in some manufactories, are all performed by distinct hands ... Each person... might be considered as making four thousand eight hundred pins in a day. But if they had all wrought separately and independently, and without any of them having been educated to this peculiar business, they certainly could not each of them have made twenty, perhaps not one pin in a day …

By Smith’s calculation, division of labor bumped up productivity somewhere between 240 to 4,800 times. As Smith’s Wealth of Nations was published in 1776, for the first time since the ancient Greeks, productivity began to rise in the West.

If anything, this process has accelerated and deepened. This month I'm working with a client's product development team intent on rolling out a next generation computer chip that can be used in self-driving cars. The team involved in planning includes a couple of folks from Scotland, a couple from India, one from Malaysia, a couple from China and one from Austin, TX. The team working on project tasks includes an even larger swath of countries. 

We don’t just divide labor to focus on different tasks within a factory. We now divide labor across continents.

But this comes with a price. What makes us more affluent makes it more difficult to be engaged. Division of labor makes it harder for employees to see – or experience – how their tasks feed into finished products. And when a product is dependent on the efforts of so many people, it becomes harder to feel as though your own efforts make a difference.

Obviously gales of creative destruction that obsolete jobs, companies and even whole industries are the most visible element fueling the support for Trump’s promise of a national economy that won’t lose jobs to overseas competition. I suspect, though, that this curious alienation that comes from the steady division of labor that has started with pins and extended to transistors so small that their state can be changed by subatomic particles (true story), is a big part of why we don’t feel more certain of the gains that have come through this process that has made us part of a global economy.

Trump's protectionist policies will stymie this force for progress. His economic policies are awful. To me, the fact that policies which reverse the increased specialization and global trade take us backwards is hardly worth arguing. (Although I have argued it here.) The bigger question is why Trump's anti-trade policies won so many converts. I think the answer is, in part, psychological. Progress has made us more affluent; it has also made it harder for us to be engaged in our work.

Csizkzentmihalyi reported on a studies of where people find flow. People doing more traditional work like farming are more likely to find flow - or engagement - work. People doing more modern work are more likely to find flow in leisure. Tasks that we can see the whole of - building a cabinet or sheering sheep or cooking a meal - are tasks that are easier to find flow in than tasks that are merely some small part of a larger process. 

What does this mean? Economic progress is at odds with psychological well being. As our work becomes more specialized and we're more productive, we run the risk of becoming less engaged in our work and less happy. 

I do think there is a fix for this and it goes back to Csikszentmihayli's work on flow. For the last 100 years - well, at least the last 50 years or so -  we've focused on the quality of the product, what we experience as consumers. At its current peak of evolution, this focus on what customers experience with your product is called UX, or user experience. It's a big deal and rightfully so. It's a big part of how we've made the post-Adam Smith rise in productivity translate into more happiness as a consumer. What's next? We focus on our work as producers. We can create video games that engage and delight; we can also design work - just as we design products - to engage and delight.

I won't pretend that the only problem with globalization is that specialization can lead to stronger feelings of alienation than more traditional work. I will say, though, that as we become better at designing work to engage us when we are wearing our producer hat, jobs and work will become less a matter of angst and anger than it has in recent decades and will make it easier to sustain support for a process that has not only made us more affluent than our ancestors but more affluent than they could even imagine.

05 March 2017

The Fourth Economy & the Popularization of Entrepreneurship (or how work evolves from farming to entrepreneurship)


Graphic created by Jacob Morch jacobmorch.com

The definition of work changes as economies evolve. The grandchildren of farmers became factory workers and the grandchildren of factory workers became knowledge workers.  There’s good reason to believe that the definition of employee will change again, this time into something like entrepreneurship.

Thomas Jefferson imagined the United States as a country of educated, gentleman farmers. Even when he became president in 1801, though, the percentage of Americans farming had begun its steady decline. Now, each month economists await the announcement of nonfarm payroll employment. Today farm jobs are not even included in the country’s defining measure of jobs lost and gained.



Alexander Hamilton’s vision of an industrialized nation turned out to be more prescient but in recent decades, manufacturing’s share of the work force has also been in steady decline. Next century, economists may await the nonmanufacturing payroll employment report.


  
Millions voted for Trump and his promise to bring back manufacturing jobs. As promises go, it seems more akin to a 1916 campaign promise to bring back farming jobs than an adaptation to new realities. Yet acknowledging that farming and manufacturing are unlikely to reverse their decline leaves us with the question about the source of next generation jobs.
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The economy has shifted but policy has not. Until economic policy begins to address the new limit, it will continue to be ineffective.

Over the last 40 or 50 years the per capita GDP growth rate has fallen. The fallout is not just economic. It has made voters less trusting of major institutions and expressed itself in surprising victories for BREXIT and Trump. Most people now feel that “the system is broken, unfair, and failing them.”[1]


Meanwhile, one place that has done remarkably well in the last half century is Silicon Valley, a place that more than any other has become synonymous with entrepreneurship.

About a century ago, Henry Ford made business history by doubling the wages of his factory workers. Doubling. Not only was he making cars more affordable, he was paying working class people enough to buy them.

In 2016, median wages in the US were about $51,000 a year. Like Ford, Silicon Valley has doubled that. In Santa Clara County – one reasonable approximation of Silicon Valley – average wages were $117k, or 118% higher than the national average.



It’s possible that Silicon Valley is an anomaly, a place that other communities can only envy but never emulate. A more interesting possibility is that Silicon Valley is to a new entrepreneurial economy what Manchester, England of the 1700s was to a new industrial economy: just the first place to enter a new economy whose practices will eventually spread around the world.

Four Economies and Four Limits
Agricultural economies give way to industrial economies, which give way to information economies. Most people share that intuition but their understanding of what these labels mean and how to distinguish between them is fuzzy. Even industrial economies have farms and information economies have factories. It takes a little explanation, but limits can clarify the distinction between different economies and predict a fourth, entrepreneurial economy.

Economy
Period in West
1st, Agricultural
1300 to 1700
2nd, Industrial
1700 to 1900
3rd, Information
1900 to 2000
4th, Entrepreneurial
2000 to ~

Before talking about economies, imagine a factory with four stages. It gets raw materials in on one end and sends product out the other. The materials that become a finished product must pass through all four stages before they’re sold.


The numbers and height of the bar indicate how many products a stage can process in an hour. The first stage can process only 1, the second can process 2 and the fourth and final stage has the capacity to process 4 products an hour.
The customers don’t buy the unfinished product from any intermediate phase, though. They only buy product that comes out of the whole factory, product that has passed through all four phases. The question is, what is the capacity of this whole factory? How many products can it produce per hour?



The answer is 1 per hour. Your factory’s capacity is equal to the capacity of your first stage. You could call that a bottleneck, a constraint or limit. Whatever you call it, this limit defines the capacity for your whole factory. If it can only feed the next stage 1 item per hour, it doesn’t matter that the second stage has the capacity to process 2 items per hour because it won’t get product fast enough to process that many.

Until you increase the capacity of the first stage, you will not increase the capacity of your factory. So, you experiment. Maybe you speed up the process, simplify the process or just buy a second machine for that first stage. However you do it, you eventually double the capacity of this first stage to get a picture like this:


The good news is that by doubling the capacity of the first stage you have just doubled output for the whole factory. Armed with the knowledge that focusing on the first stage makes all the difference, you continue to experiment and invest in improving that first stage until you find a way to double its capacity again.


This time, though, doubling the capacity of your first stage does not change your factory output. Why? You were so successful at improving the first stage that it is no longer the limit to your factory. Your limit has shifted elsewhere.

Two lessons from your factory could apply to any system.[2]
  •        To improve the system, you have to focus on the limit, and
  •        Success eventually shifts the limit.


So, what limits an economy? In every introductory economics course, students learn that there are just four factors of production: land, capital, labor, and entrepreneurship. Anything of value created by an economy depends on some mix of these four factors and one of those would have to be the limit at any given stage of economic development. Land includes all natural resources, from herring to oil, acreage and cotton. Capital includes the financial and industrial tools that transform those natural resources into finished products, the factories that can turn cotton into clothing and the stocks or bonds that finance the machines and factories. After the industrial revolution, the labor of knowledge workers – people like accountants, engineers and advertisers – who manipulate the symbols of things rather than actual things was the most defining labor. Finally, entrepreneurship brings together land, capital and labor into a profitable enterprise.

The four phases of a factory can become four factors of production in an economy and we can examine limits to an economy in the same way that we examined limits to the factory. The output of an economy can be measured by things like jobs or wealth, income or GDP.


Different limits create different economies
Agricultural economies are limited by land. Wealth between 1300 and 1700 didn’t result from advances in information technology (not that the Gutenberg Press wasn’t disruptive) but instead came from trade, conquest, and colonization with faraway lands and creating nation-states and private property in your own land.

An industrial economy is limited by capital. Between 1700 and 1900, the creation of wealth was less about exploration, conquest and colonization than it was about building the factories that could turn raw materials into finished goods and then build out canals and railroads to distribute those goods. Wool and cotton became fashion. Iron ore became railroads. Skyscrapers rose in cities and cars emerged to drive between them.

An information economy is limited by knowledge workers. Between 1900 and 2000, it wasn’t enough to have factories that could make more products than anyone had ever seen before. They had to be the right products (which required marketing and design expertise) made for and sent to the right places (which took manufacturing and distribution knowledge) by the right methods (which took advertising and retail display experts.)

An information economy emerges after an industrial economy. Before the automation of the industrial economy, you need workers to manipulate actual things, afterwards, machines can do that and  labor can shift its focus to manipulating symbols. The sequence from agricultural to industrial to information economies is not just an historical sequence, it’s a logical one.

Economy
Limit
Period in West
1st, Agricultural
Land
1300 to 1700
2nd, Industrial
Capital
1700 to 1900
3rd, Information
Knowledge Workers
1900 to 2000
4th, Entrepreneurial
Entrepreneurship
2000 to ~

Economies are complicated and progress is slow so it makes sense that as communities gradually overcome limits they’ll cling to the processes that once made them great. Like the factory manager who keeps doubling the capacity of his first process step to no avail, communities can continue to create foreign colonies, spending huge sums on a global empire even after they’ve entered an industrial economy. Or more recently, they might pump money into their economy or create graduates past the point that capital or knowledge workers actually limit the rise in per capita GDP. It is almost inevitable that communities will continue to do what they’re now good at even after reaching a point of diminishing benefit. Cultures last longer than cost-benefit analysis and new practices become old habits.

An additional complication is that there are always pockets within a larger community that face earlier limits, and those limits define local culture and politics. When natural resources are the basis for wealth in a region, for instance, it will be more religious and more inclined towards policies like a strong military that support the notion of a zero-sum economy. It’s not the ingenuity of people that creates an oil field but is instead just a gift of God or nature. And that oil field doesn’t get larger because we decided to share it. Either I own it or you do, and rather than win-win we’re going to have a winner and a loser in this exchange. There will always be regions that lead or lag in development and thus will lead or lag in the reality they experience and that informs their convictions. It’s not just that a person living in rural Kentucky has a different political philosophy than her peer in Cambridge, MA; the daily reality that informs her perspective is different.
One other way to understand a limit is to look at its price. Scarce factors are expensive and abundant factors are cheap.

The success of the second economy made capital abundant. Traditional bankers who emerged from the second economy (many of our current banking practices were defined in England by 1900) carefully loaned out money, trying to minimize the risk of losing capital. Venture capitalists, by contrast, treat capital as abundant and fully expect to lose quite a few investments. Given they’re taking equity in a new firm rather than hoping to get back capital with interest, they know that only a fraction of their investments need to succeed in order for them to get great returns. Traditional banking evolved when capital was scarce: venture capitalists evolved when capital was abundant.
What is scarce now? Entrepreneurship and we can see that in its price. At 31, Bill Gates became the richest self-made billionaire in history. A generation later, Mark Zuckerberg became a billionaire at 24. The price of capital is the interest rate and towards the end of last year, investors owned about $12 trillion in negative interest rate bonds. Trillion. We have a glut of capital and a shortage of entrepreneurs, which suggests that effective policy would focus on increasing the supply of entrepreneurs rather than the supply of capital. Between 1700 and 1900, we learned how to increase the supply of capital through a variety of means, from popularizing savings and investment (from founding father proverbs like “A penny saved …” to expanding the number of people who bought wartime bonds and then later became savers) to changing the money supply or interest rates. If policy makers think that we’re short of capital, they can quickly pump billions into the economy. There are no comparable policy levers for increasing levels of entrepreneurship. Not yet.

When The Old Limits No Longer Limit
If capital were still a limit, we’d be in great shape. The S&P 500 have $1.5 trillion in cash and in the third quarter of last year they paid out $200 billion in dividends and stock buybacks. Banks excess reserves have dropped from their August 2014 high of $2.7 trillion but are still at a staggering $1.9 trillion.[3] (Before the Great Recession, excess reserves in the US were closer to $1.5 billion.)

Our education system helped us to overcome the limit of knowledge workers. In 1900, less than 10% of 14 to 17 year olds were formally enrolled in education. By 2000, less than 10% were not. In a century, the US went from an industrial economy dependent on child labor to an information economy dependent on adult education. That helped to transform life in the 20th century, real incomes increasing 6X to 8X and life expectancy rising from 47 to 77.

If knowledge workers and their information technology were still a limit, creating more graduates would help to create more jobs. In 2013, the American education system created 3.7 million graduates, everything from folks with AA degrees to PhDs and all the degrees in between. That same year, the economy ended the year with 2.4 million more jobs than it had at the start. We’re creating graduates faster than we’re creating jobs, 15 new graduates for every 10 net new jobs. It’s no wonder that student debt is becoming a growing issue.

It’s not just ineffectual to pursue old policies in a new economy. It can be dangerous.

A glut of money creates problems. Investors in search of returns, unwilling to accept negative interest rate bonds, too readily bought expensive things like tech stocks in 1999 or subprime mortgage instruments in 2007. Trillions in investments can create a series of bubbles and busts as it wanders the earth like a murmuration of starlings in search of returns.

A glut of graduates creates problems. Young people not only start careers with mounting debt but find it more difficult to find jobs they could not have worked with just a high school diploma. Millennials who are the best-educated generation in history nevertheless fear that they’ll be the first generation in American history to do worse than their parents. (This student debt will also make it tougher for them to finance startups. As medical school has become more expensive, for example, the percentage of doctors working for large groups or hospital has gone up relative to those who start a private practice.)

One consequence of continuing to pursue dated policies is that it makes it tougher to pursue any policy. When incomes are steadily rising, politics is civil. Families can pay a little more in taxes to support schools and help the poor while still taking home more pay after taxes. When incomes are stagnant, politics becomes more divisive. Few people like the idea of not supporting education or the sick but if the choice is between that or less take home pay? Well, the conversation becomes more heated and compromise is harder to reach on top of the fact that everyone starts this policy conversation disenchanted and bewildered.

We don’t need to jettison incredible financial and educational systems that are essentially over-producing, creating more capital or graduates than we can fully employ. We just have to stop looking to those systems as the means to create jobs and wealth. As we become successful at overcoming this new limit of entrepreneurship, we’ll be able to fully employ capital and college grads. Eventually, we will even create enough demand for them to bid their prices up further.


The Central Question of Every Economy
The central question for any generation concerned about economic progress is how to overcome its limit, not the limit of its grandparents or founding fathers. Creative answers to that question result in a new economy and a very different community.

In retrospect, the central question of economic development from about 1700 to 1900 was simple: how do we get more capital and make it more productive? The creative answers to this included everything from the Dutch stock market, Rothschild’s international bond market and the British banking system to the spinning jenny, steam engine, and continuous production technology. (The question is simple. The answers can be complicated.)

The central question of last century was, how do we create more knowledge workers and make them more productive? The creative answers to this included the popularization of K-12 education, the modern university, R&D labs, the modern corporation and information technology.

The question that policy makers everywhere – city hall and senate floor, corporate boardrooms and universities – should now ask has two parts:
  •       How do we create more entrepreneurs and make them more effective?
  •        How do we make employees more entrepreneurial?

Creative answers to these simple questions will transform the economy. We now have a financial system and an education system. We don’t have an entrepreneurial system but instead expect our entrepreneurs just to show up, like autodidacts in 1800. Changing will be an odd, fascinating and profitable project. Think about educating students to be prepared to become entrepreneurs in the same way that we now educate students to become university students and knowledge workers, for instance, or changing the definition of employee.

Changing the Definition of Work. Again.

Perhaps more interesting than the question of how to create more entrepreneurs is the question of how to make employees more entrepreneurial. We – rightfully – make a big deal about national economic policy. It’s worth keeping in mind that measured by GDP or revenue, of the 100 biggest economic entities only 31 are countries; the other 69 are corporations. (Walmart’s $480 billion in revenue would put it just between Sweden and Belgium’s GDP.) Corporate policy deserves as much discussion as national policy if we’re interested in progress. The most important topic in this discussion might be to ask what it means to be an employee in a time when AI like IBM’s Watson is liable to automate knowledge work in the same way that capital automated manual work.

Think about changing employment so that employees within a corporation had as much freedom to pursue new ventures as citizens within a country. Roughly 800,000 Americans make more than the $400,000 a year that we pay the president.[4] That sort of thing was unthinkable in Egypt under Hosni Mubarak or France under King Louis XIV, but as nation-states evolve, people within them have the potential to prosper more than even the head of state. Contrast that with how evolved the corporation is. While it’s common for professional athletes or portfolio managers to make more than their managers, it is rare that anyone inside a traditional Fortune 500 firm makes more than the CEO. What if employees could become more entrepreneurial, were able to create equity by taking existing products into new markets or by leading product and business development efforts that are akin to startup activities? And what if the success of those ventures could actually result in their making more than the head of the company in the same way that an American entrepreneur has the potential to make more than the American president? This dispersion of power and pay is just one way that the popularization of entrepreneurship will change the corporation.

Overcoming the limit of entrepreneurship will require and result in new legislation, new education, and new definitions of what it means to be an employee. As importantly, it will continue in a grand tradition of the west, doing for business what earlier economies did for religion, politics, and finance. That is, it will expand freedom for the individual. There is no way to make employees more entrepreneurial without giving them more freedom.

There are interesting examples of popularizing entrepreneurship within companies. Ricardo Semler did something interesting with his Brazilian company Semco. He gave his employees freedom to negotiate work arrangements. People working side by side on the factory floor doing similar work might have very different arrangements. One was paid hourly, another a monthly salary, another paid by piecework and another might actually be paying Semco to use equipment to make product that she – the employee – could later sell herself. Uber lets “employees” accept or reject specific fares and take just one fare a week or work all day. Amazon’s marketplace and Apple’s iTunes are platforms that let companies and entrepreneurs sell their own products. P&G is among the companies who richly reward successful product development leads whose responsibilities overlap quite a bit with entrepreneurs. All of these are examples of enabling entrepreneurship, blurring the boundary between traditional definitions of employee and entrepreneur, and giving the employee more freedom to define their own work and its results.

This matter of employees gaining more autonomy is not incidental to progress. Autonomy is a way to define progress and each new economy has given the individual in the West more freedom. If you have shoes you have more options about where to go than if you are barefoot; if you have a car you have even more options. If you live in a democracy, you have more options about what to believe and how to live than if you live in a theocracy. If you have a credit card you have more options than if you need to approach a banker to request a loan for a specific item, or can’t get a loan at all. If you have the freedom to create equity as an employee you have more freedom than if you’re expected to adhere to a process someone else defined.

The popularization of entrepreneurship will increase our product options and levels of wealth. Progress, though, is only partly about more and better products. That is only one way that our lives expand to include more options. The first economy didn’t just bring potatoes and tomatoes to Europe; it brought religious freedom. The second economy didn’t just bring fashion and automobiles to households; it brought democratic freedoms. And the third economy didn’t just give us radio and the polio vaccine; it made capitalists out of knowledge workers, giving them financial options that people in 1900 would have found as baffling as the internet. The fourth economy will transform business and work in the same way that the first three economies transformed religion, politics, and finance. That is, it will give us more autonomy, as economic progress always does.

As you might imagine, there is a great deal more to this new economy than would can be captured here. My book, The Fourth Economy: Inventing Western Civilization, can be found here. It's a longer read but it does explain progress from the Dark Ages to about 2050.



[1] https://twitter.com/Bill_Gross/status/821245915579240448
[2] Eli Goldratt, author of The Goal and Critical Chain popularized the ideas of Theory of Constraints (TOC) in the 1980s and 1990s within many Fortune 500 companies and government agencies.
[3] https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/EXCSRESNS
[4] https://www.ssa.gov/cgi-bin/netcomp.cgi?year=2015